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Abstract 
This article examines the discourses framing citizenship education in Ukraine and Russia 
from perestroika to the present. We argue that there is a tension between the discourses of 
democratization and state consolidation and that the intensity of these discourses varies in 
time in both countries. Russia and Ukraine display both similarities and differences in the 
kind and intensity of discourses, which we relate to differential points of departure and 
domestic political events. An important similarity is the emphasis on state cohesion from 
the mid 1990s. This concern was sparked by the emergence of separatist movements in 
peripheral regions. Pressure from the Council of Europe to implement the programme 
Education for Democratic Citizenship in the national curricula is not seen as an important 
factor shaping the citizenship education policies of Ukraine and Russia. From this we 
conclude that national politics and anxieties about state cohesion still far outweigh 
international pressures in the realm of citizenship education. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The relationship between citizenship education and authority has been hotly debated by 
scholars from a range of disciplines. Central to this debate is the question of whether 
citizenship education should nurture loyal law-abiding citizens aware of their duties and 
responsibilities to state and society, or produce citizens who stand up for their rights, 
question state authority and are open to other views and cultures (McCowan, 2004). This 
article will not touch on the normative dimension of this debate. Rather, it seeks to explore 
how two new states arising from the ashes of the Soviet Union – Ukraine and the Russian 
Federation - have come to terms with this dilemma in their citizenship education policies 
following independence.  
 
New states are interesting arena in which to examine citizenship education, as these states 
tend to give priority to nation-building policies in the first decades of their existence, i.e. to 
policies promoting cultural unity and unconditional loyalty to the state (Coulby, 1997; 
Green, 1997). Moreover, it seems particularly relevant to examine post-communist new 
states as it has been noted that a history of communist rule has not been conducive to civic 
attitudes, pluralism and tolerance. Schöpflin (2000) for instance contends that communism 
destroyed civil society and the social fabric of communities, leaving people isolated and 
distrustful of the state and of their fellow citizens. After the Soviet break-up, he argues, 
intolerant ethnonational identities filled the vacuum that the communists had left behind. 
Assuming this view to be valid, balanced citizenship education policies aimed at both 
conformity and critical thinking may not be possible at all in the transition states.  
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Among the post-communist states Ukraine and Russia provide fascinating case studies 
because they have different points of departure. Whereas Russia considers itself to be the 
successor state of the Soviet Union and therefore has to come to terms with a loss of 
territory and a declining status as superpower, Ukraine is a new state insecure of the 
loyalty of its citizens. While Russia is still a powerful state possessing nuclear arms and an 
abundance of natural resources, Ukraine relies on conventional weaponry for its defence 
and is dependent on other countries for its gas and oil consumption. This situation makes 
Ukraine much more concerned about its external security than Russia. Whereas Russians 
can be confident about the continuing strength and appeal of their language and culture, 
Ukrainians are struggling to gain acceptance for their cultural heritage, which has often 
patronisingly been identified as Malorussian (little Russian), i.e. a simple peasant offshoot 
of Russian culture. We assume that these different starting points and the national political 
developments emanating from them affect the discourses of citizenship education. 
 
Lastly, both countries are embedded in numerous global networks which seek to influence 
their domestic policies including citizenship education. The involvement of the Council of 
Europe (COE) is interesting in this regard. From the mid-1990s this intergovernmental 
organization has developed a range of activities to promote the idea of active and critical 
citizenship in its member states. Thus the COE fosters the very side of citizenship 
education that is difficult to reconcile with the objective of achieving unconditional loyalty 
to and identification with the state and the nation. In the ensuing analysis we aim to 
explore whether elements of the COE‟s vision on citizenship, which is critical, 
multicultural and post-national, are included in the national policy documents. We will 
interpret a complete absence of these elements in the policy documents as a sign that 
nation-building issues are (still) of overriding importance to the national authorities.  
 
The comparative dimension employed in this article is both horizontal and vertical. 
Horizontally, we compare Russia and Ukraine in the realm of citizenship education 
policies, taking into consideration their similarities and differences in socio-political and 
educational contexts. Vertically, we seek to "read the global" (Cowen, 2000), i.e. to 
understand the complexities of the global context in which national citizenship education 
policies are developed and often contested. In view of the tendency of international actors 
to offer universalised policy programmes for all contexts, we want to examine the 
"blockages" and "permeabilities" (ibid) of Russian and Ukrainian citizenship education 
policies regarding the citizenship education ideology of the Council of Europe.  
 
Briefly recapitulating, our study is guided by the following questions: 
1. Which discourses have framed citizenship education in Russia and Ukraine since the late 
1980s and have there been changes in the intensity of each of them? 
2. To what extent can possible differences between Russia and Ukraine in the nature and 
timing of these discourses be attributed to differential points of departure and national 
political developments? 
3. Can the COE‟s critical and pluralist vision on citizenship education be observed in the 
educational policies of the two countries?  
 
As our focus is on the discourses framing citizenship education, we examine the subject 
through curricula, policy documents, and articles in the educational press. We are primarily 
concerned with the ideas these texts convey rather than with the implementation of 
citizenship education policies. The article starts with the introduction of the tensions 
inherent in citizenship education. It is then followed by a brief discussion on the Council of 
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Europe‟s citizenship education initiative. Subsequently we examine the educational 
developments in Ukraine and Russia.  
 
We argue that the discourses of active democratic citizenship and nation-building do not 
easily co-exist in the citizenship education policies of both countries following the break-
up of the Soviet Union. An increased salience of one tends to coincide with a diminishing 
importance of the other. Particularly in times of turmoil and separatist confrontations, 
nationalizing programmes emphasizing unity, conformity and loyalty quickly overshadow 
initiatives promoting democratization, individual autonomy and respect for diversity. In 
recent years Ukraine and Russia seem to drift apart, as Ukraine embraces democratic 
citizenship principles in an effort to partake in European trends while Russia prioritizes 
patriotic education. However, given the unsettled nature of post-communist politics, it 
would be premature to interpret these developments as signs of permanently diverging 
trajectories. 
 
 
Citizenship education 
 
Citizenship is membership in a political and national community, which requires 
knowledge and skills to act in the community as well as a sense of identification with this 
community. By citizenship education we understand all those educational norms and 
practices which seek to socialise future generations into the realm of the state and the 
nation. From this perspective, citizenship education is always a future-oriented process 
guided by visions of the desirable society. As these visions are multiple and change with 
time and within different segments of the society, citizenship education is always a 
political endeavour, both in terms of agreement and implementation, as well as its 
consequences for the future. The contested and deeply political nature of citizenship 
education explains why there are shifts in the content and relative strength of various 
discourses depending on the political and societal contexts.  
 
Philosophers and political thinkers have for a long time debated on the nature of 
citizenship and citizenship education. Aristotle, for example, argued that citizenship 
education should serve the requirements of the state. That is why he admired the Spartan 
model of civic training, which turned young boys into obedient soldiers and eventually 
brought them to full citizenship (Heater, 1990, pp. 7-8). A later tradition, rooted in the 
writings of Locke, advocated citizenry which is critical and ready to change the existing 
societal and political structures. In line with these views Paolo Freire, for example, argued 
for citizenship education that helps to uncover the unjust nature of society and to 
encourage deliberate action. The first view can be rightfully criticised for treating people as 
mere objects of citizenship indoctrination, whereas the latter might easily promote 
centrifugal forces and thus endanger societal stability.  
 
Adding to the complexity of this debate is the fact that citizenship in the modern times has 
been linked to the ideology of nationalism and nationality. Affiliating the political concept 
of citizenship with the nation meant that modern citizenship had to incorporate not only 
rights and duties but also a sense of tradition, community and identity (Heater, 2002, p. 
99). In Ancient Greece citizenship meant participation in the political affairs of the city-
state, the polis. But already then Aristotle claimed that “the citizens of the state must know 
one another‟s characters” (quoted in Heater, 1990, p. 3). In the modern state, the required 
intimacy was replaced by the myth of belonging to one nation, the “imagined community”. 
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The nation was supposed to turn a mere bureaucratic state into our state, which expressed 
the will of the people and captured their loyalty (Canovan, 1998, p. 23).  
 
Thus, the dilemma regarding the allegiance to the state vs. critical evaluation of its 
institutions is further deepened by the fact that citizenship education should create and 
strengthen the bond between the citizen and the nation. Among others, the creation and 
maintenance of nations involves the invention of tradition, the re-writing and even 
falsification of history and assimilation of ethnic groups. In order to maintain the nation, 
the future generations are not supposed to question the inherited cultural norms and myths. 
Otherwise an independent critical mind could easily put the fate of the nation at danger. 
Even older nation-states, such as the UK or France, continue to inculcate the feeling of 
belonging to the nationhood. The Crick report (1998), which forms the basis for the 
English citizenship education curricula, declares the main aim “to find or restore a sense of 
common citizenship, including a national identity that is secure enough to find a place in 
the plurality of nations, cultures, ethnic identities and religions long found in the United 
Kingdom” (quoted in Osler & Starkey, 2001, p. 293). The French programmes also stress 
national identity and nationality in all grades (Osler & Starkey 2001).  
 
If these tensions continue to haunt citizenship education in the established states, how do 
they influence the emerging states, such as Ukraine and the Russian Federation? The recent 
history of these countries has shown that the task of forming a state and identifying who 
belongs to the nation are not easily fulfilled. The situation in these countries is further 
complicated by the fact that they are embedded in the global networks, which seek to 
influence national processes including the ideology of citizenship education.  
 
The Council of Europe and the ideology of critical citizenship 
 
The Council of Europe represents an important European agent promoting democracy, 
human rights and the rule of law in the societies of its member-states (46 by October 
2004). Having been established immediately after the Second World War, the organization 
initially drew its members mainly from Western Europe. More than half of the current 
member-states, including Ukraine and Russia, joined the institution only after the collapse 
of the iron curtain (1995 and 1996 respectively)
1
. 
 
At the summit meeting of the Heads of State and Government held in Strasbourg in 
October 1997, it was decided to launch an initiative for Education for Democratic 
Citizenship (EDC). The year 2002 played a crucial role in the further development of the 
project, as the Committee of Ministers adopted the Recommendation to member states on 
education for democratic citizenship (Rec (2002)12). As a result, the year 2005 became A 
European Year of Citizenship through Education
2
. Among the multiple objectives of this 
initiative the one that has captured our attention seeks “to strengthen the capacity of 
member states to make the EDC a priority objective of educational policy-making and 
implement sustainable reform at all levels of the education system” (Council of Europe, 
2004). Such statements prove that the Council‟s citizenship work has grown into an 
ambitious project, which is expected to have a tangible effect on both policy level and 
grassroots‟ activity in all member-states. 
                                                 
1
 For a brief history of the Council of Europe see http://www.coe.int/T/e/Com/about_coe/ 
2
 For more information on the EDC project see 
http://www.coe.int/T/E/Cultural_Co-operation/education/E.D.C/ 
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In the context of the article it is important to note that the COE‟s understanding of 
citizenship is largely based on the notion of active participation, tolerance and critical 
evaluation of institutional arrangements. Lucas (2001, 820) has noted that the 
supranational postmodernist dynamics essentially pressure states to recognise the 
multicultural composition of their populations. This pressure, he explains, is likely to 
conflict with the „modernist‟ approach to nationhood in the newly independent states: 
 
In ex-Communist, newly independent states, national governments are confronted 
with the task of designing policies and development paths that forge a compromise 
between modernist and postmodernist, supranational projects. This is not easy due 
to the fact that these two approaches are at odds with each other. States that 
prioritise the modernist, ideologically dominant traits of nation-statehood to the 
exclusion of multicultural openness and pluralist political culture will tend to 
exclude themselves from the rapidly evolving “glocalised” environment in which 
all nation-states increasingly find themselves. But the modern nation-state cannot 
truly open itself to its postmodern social and cultural environment without 
becoming self-critical of its traditional historical heritage and its own history of 
discrimination against “foreign” and minority cultures. (ibid, 821.) 
 
What Lucas points at is the conflicting logic of national and post-national projects, the 
latter being increasingly promoted by supranational agents, such as the Council of Europe. 
In order to concur with the post-national transition, states should permit a multiplicity of 
identifications among their populations, as well as an atmosphere of pluralism and critical 
questioning regarding the state, the nation and their historical legacy. 
 
In the educational context these contradictory objectives could be described in terms of 
"citizenship education" and "education for citizenship" (Forrester 2003). Whereas the 
former promotes democratization, individual autonomy, respect for diversity, challenging 
authority and standing up for one‟s rights, the latter emphasizes responsibility, conformity, 
national loyalty and service to the community. Obviously, the Council of Europe's critical 
and multicultural initiative can be equated with “citizenship education”, while a traditional 
nation-building project is more in line with "education for citizenship". It is precisely the 
latter that is likely to be prioritized in the former communist states, as they are 
reconstructing their national statehood. As members of the COE, does this mean that 
Ukraine and Russia will contest the COE's policy on EDC? These issues along with the 
tensions inherent in the notion of citizenship provide the background to the following 
discussion of educational developments in Ukraine and Russia.  
 
Ukraine 
 
Since the late 1980s several discourses have been competing for primacy in the broad area 
of citizenship education. There have been clear shifts in the relative strength of each of 
these discourses over time. We can roughly distinguish three periods. The first period finds 
its origins in the late Glasnost era and is characterized by the uneasy coexistence of the 
discourses of democratization („citizenship education‟) and nation-building („education for 
citizenship‟). The second period, starting with the presidential elections of 1994, is marked 
by a continuation of state and nation-building rhetoric and a marginalization of issues 
relating to school autonomy, democracy and pupil centred pedagogy. From the end of the 
1990s nation-building concerns have gradually moved to the background and the notions 
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of democratization and active citizenship have reappeared as part of a desire to link 
Ukrainian education to European trends. The discussion of the three periods will highlight 
the tension between the discourses of nation-building on the one hand and democratization 
and active citizenship on the other. It will also point to the significance of domestic 
political factors in shaping the educational agenda. 
 
1989-1994: democratization and nation-building 
 
Democratization and nation-building issues have dominated much educational thought in 
Ukraine from the late 1980s to the mid 1990s, when oppositional movements enabled by 
Glasnost and Perestroika first began to challenge the communist monopoly on power. 
These discourses were directly related to the break down of communism as the central state 
ideology. Democratization, for instance, was expressed by sharp condemnations of the 
monolithic Soviet pedagogy and by appeals for pupil-centred pedagogy and grassroots‟ 
involvement in education. Thus, one observer noted that “unfortunately, the 
bureaucratization and over-regulation of all aspects of school education and the command-
administrative style of leadership have given rise to such formalism and humbug that high-
quality secondary education truly remains an ideological myth if these obstacles are not 
overcome” (Goncharenko 1991, p. 2).  
 
The Communist Party was also heavily criticized for its cultural policies. Dissidents and 
Ukrainian intellectuals accused the Soviet government of pursuing a policy of gradual 
cultural attrition of the Ukrainian nation by russifying all sectors of public life. Towards 
the close of the 1980s, they established the oppositional movement Rukh which began to 
mobilize public sentiment on the Ukrainian national revival issue (Hrycak 2004). 
Education was identified as the key domain to reinvigorate the Ukrainian language and 
culture. 
 
The Law on Languages of autumn 1989 marked an early victory for these nation-building 
activists. Passed by a still communist Supreme Soviet, which increasingly felt beleaguered 
by Rukh, it proclaimed Ukrainian the sole state language of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic 
(Arel, 1995). To the present day this law regulates the use of Ukrainian in education and in 
other public domains. As a vital instrument for later governments to base their language 
policies on, the law marked the onset of a cultural nation-building project that sought to 
redress russification and to (re)affirm Ukrainian distinctiveness vis-à-vis Russia.  
 
The years prior to independence also saw the first attempts to reform the education system 
in a democratic direction. Amidst unstoppable centrifugal processes at the Union level, the 
Ukrainian Supreme Soviet passed the 1991 Education Act. Surrounded by ever louder calls 
for democratization and a humanitarian orientation of the curriculum (e.g. Krasna, 
Shevel‟ov & Biloshyts‟kyi, 1991; Yakymenko 1991), this law marked the beginning of a 
process to dismantle the rigid, centralised Soviet education system. It stated that the key 
objectives of the new educational policy were to establish ideologically-neutral school 
curricula, to develop the personal talents and skills of youngsters and to raise them as 
multifaceted individuals on their way to become invaluable contributors to society. It 
further noted that “Education in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic is based on the principles of 
humanism, democracy, national self-consciousness and mutual respect between nations” 
(1991 Education Act, p. 276). As a complete novelty, it offered schools autonomy in the 
planning of the teaching process, in the employment of teaching staff, in financial and 
administrative matters and in commercial activities.  
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After the sudden advent of independence in August 1991 and the election of communist 
turned nationalist Kravchuk as Ukraine‟s first president, a new Rukh-dominated 
government was installed, which energetically took up the twin tasks of nation-building 
and educational reform. It laid down its vision in the “State National Program „Education‟ 
(Ukraine of the XXI Century)”, a strategic policy document prepared by a group of 
scientists and teachers. This document took the new spirit of the 1991 Education Act one 
step further by condemning Soviet educational practices in particularly harsh terms and by 
proposing radical reforms. It, for instance, lamented “the authoritarian pedagogy instituted 
by a totalitarian state which led to a levelling of natural talents, skills and engagement of 
all educational practitioners”. This was meant to be replaced by a system offering a wide 
range of educational methods, approaches and orientations to accommodate the varying 
talents and preferences of individual pupils. It also called for “a radical restructuring of the 
administration of education through democratization, decentralization and the institution of 
a regional system of educational authorities” (State National Programme „Education‟, 
1994, pp. 7-8).  
 
Parallel to the emphasis on democratization and pupil-centred pedagogy, the document 
advocated the education of national traditions. It accused the Soviet regime of having given 
rise to “a devaluation of general humanistic values, national nihilism and a disconnection 
of education from national origins”. The program thus saw values formation, national 
consciousness and education in national traditions as closely linked phenomena. 
Consequently, to undo the Soviet legacy and restore moral standards, the new education 
system was urged to exhibit:  
 
a national orientation which proceeds from the indivisibility of education from national 
foundations, the organic unity with national history and folk traditions, the preservation 
and enrichment of the culture of the Ukrainian people and (…) harmonious interethnic 
relations (ibid, pp. 7, 9). 
 
The program thus expected public education to reflect and cultivate a national identity that 
is grounded in history and culture.  
 
The dual objectives of democratization and cultural nation-building held each other in an 
uneasy balance, however. The tension between the two concepts surfaced in an ambivalent 
official statement by education minister Talanchuk: “We must overcome the former 
overemphasis on collectivism, which caused an underestimation of individuality, but we 
have no right to foster unrestrained domination of individualism which contradicts our 
people‟s collectivist traditions originated in the customs of Cossack communities” (quoted 
in Stepanenko, 1999, p. 102). In terms of actual policy, it was soon evident that the 
government gave priority to nation-building, as it mobilized all levels of the state apparatus 
to ukrainianize primary, secondary and higher education (Janmaat, 1999). In cases where 
the two objectives conflicted, nation-building overruled democratization, as happened 
when education minister Talanchuk prohibited students in higher education to vote on the 
language of instruction at the beginning of the 1993-4 academic year (Janmaat, 2000a).  
 
The reform of history education in schools also testified to the priority given to identity 
construction. The Ministry of Education endorsed a narrative that interpreted the history of 
Ukraine as an age-long struggle of Ukrainians to free themselves from foreign domination, 
and presented this narrative as the unquestionable historical reality. The new nationalist 
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inspired account was formalized in a separate History of Ukraine course, which reinforced 
history as a marker of national identity. According to Wanner (1995, p. 3) “This 
„restructuring‟ of historical interpretation, exchanging a communist ideology for a 
nationalist one, did little to reduce the oppressive politicization of history. Once again, 
historical interpretation is made a slave to the political machine”. Stepanenko (1999) 
expresses a similar concern by noting that both the Ukrainian and the Soviet variants of 
history aim to affirm their own version, suppressing other historical perspectives. Because 
of this, he argues, there is a genealogical relatedness of the Ukrainian nationalist mentality 
to its communist predecessor
3
. Interestingly, the re-institutionalization of a single narrative 
can be seen as a step backwards in comparison to the Perestroika period, as the Soviet 
authorities in 1990 formally permitted the teaching of history from various perspectives 
(Wanner, 1998). 
 
1994-1999: consolidated state and nation-building 
 
Political developments in the mid-1990s underlined that democratization had been more 
token than real. A desire to give local stake holders more say in policy matters, including 
in education, quickly lost out to concerns about state unity and integrity among the 
political elite in Kyiv. This elite was alarmed by the separatist movements in the Russian-
speaking Donbass and the Crimea, which had gained considerably in strength during the 
Kravchuk presidency. For the new president Leonid Kuchma, elected in July 1994, curbing 
these secessionist tendencies and enhancing state unity was the key policy objective (Kuzio 
2002). The logical consequence of this agenda was a resumption of central state control. 
The Constitution of Ukraine, adopted in June 1996, clearly reflected the renewed 
centralization, as it established Ukraine as a unitary state with a single state language and a 
strong presidency (Constitution of Ukraine, 1996). The status of the Crimea as an 
Autonomous Republic was confirmed, but the powers offered to the republic were 
restricted to the domains of agriculture, infrastructure and culture, and did not include 
education. 
 
Recentralization also manifested itself in the 1996 Education Act. This law established the 
State Standards of Education, requirements as to the content, level and volume of 
education that were mandatory for both state and private schools (1996 Education Act). It 
divided the curriculum for schools into a compulsory state and a facultative school 
component with the latter claiming up to 24 percent of the teaching time. For Stepanenko 
(1999, p. 104) the school component is an indication that some progress has been made 
regarding the democratization of the educational process, as it “presupposes choice and an 
initiative from below”. Others however are more sceptical. Wanner (1998, pp. 119, 120), 
for instance, notes that “the monolithic educational bureaucracy and the structures and 
practices of Soviet schools remain virtually in place despite decrees and announced 
reforms” [the aforementioned State National Programme] that suggest otherwise. In similar 
vein, Stepanyshyn (1997) maintains that school education in Ukraine in the second half of 
the 1990s has by and large retained Soviet features. He advocates the right for schools and 
regions to modify the mandatory components of the curriculum and argues that school 
councils should be given a greater role in contracting new staff. 
                                                 
3
 It must be noted here that Ukraine is by no means an exception in the post-Soviet world for exchanging a 
communist for a nationalist-inspired account of history. Kissane (2005) has observed that the very same 
transformation has occurred in Kazakhstan. She argues that the Kazakh government is struggling to find a 
balance between a Kazakhified history curriculum, serving identity construction purposes, and a more 
internationally oriented history programme. 
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To the surprise of many Western observers and Ukrainian nationalists, president Kuchma, 
whose native language was Russian and who had promised to make Russian the second 
state language in the run-up to the elections, continued the nation-building project of his 
predecessor after he assumed office. The new education minister Zgurovsky, though a dull 
functionary replacing the inspiring intellectual Talanchuk in the eyes of one observer 
(Ryabchuk, 2002), proceeded with the Ukrainianization of the education system. This was 
most of all reflected in policy results and administrative measures rather than in sweeping 
visions, as no new strategic documents appeared during his term of office.  
 
Parallel to ukrainianization, the educational authorities consolidated the cultivation of the 
Ukrainian national idea as laid down in history, geography and literature courses by 
preparing new programs of study, textbooks and central exams. They further ensured that 
these materials were disseminated and used in all corners of the country, overruling regions 
(notably the Crimea) that had appropriated considerable autonomy in educational matters 
in the early 1990s (Janmaat, 2000b). As the central programs and textbooks were 
mandatory for all schools irrespective of status or language of instruction, national 
minorities and regional groups had little opportunity to familiarize their children with 
alternative ideological or national perspectives (Koshmanova, 2006). 
 
According to Kolstoe (2000), Kuchma‟s decision to continue the cultural policies of his 
predecessor reflects the conviction among Ukraine‟s ruling elite that language, national 
identity and loyalty to the state are intimately related. He postulates that this elite, although 
Russian-speaking, thinks that Ukrainian statehood can only be secured in the long run if it 
is supported by a cultural identity distinct from that of Russia. Kolstoe‟s argument in fact 
seems to be supported by the shift in rationales underpinning the nation-building project. 
Whereas cultural concerns relating to the ethnocultural survival of the Ukrainian nation 
and the legacy of russification had been characteristic of the early 1990s, a political 
motivation seeing the Ukrainian language as a necessary component of Ukrainian 
statehood prevailed in the second half of the 1990s. As Wilson (2002, p. 195) put it: 
“Ukrainianization was quietly forgotten, but not reversed – even promoted in some areas if 
it coincided with Kuchma‟s vision of raison d’état”. The central elite thus considered the 
cultural nation-building project a convenient tool to enhance state cohesion. 
 
The emphasis on state consolidation, however, did not preclude international exchanges on 
history and citizenship education. From 1996 the Council of Europe in cooperation with 
the Ukrainian Ministry of Education organized a series of seminars and conferences in 
Ukraine on reforming the teaching of history and on the COE‟s Education for Democratic 
Citizenship initiative (Poliansky, 1998; Duerr, 1999). Remarkably, the Ukrainian 
participants of these seminars (civil servants, teachers and textbook writers) did not recoil 
from being highly critical of history education in Ukraine. One civil servant, for instance, 
denounced the current textbooks for presenting “black and white, uncompromising pictures 
of the past” and ascribing intentions to historical leaders that they could not have possessed 
(Poliansky, 1998, p. 13). In the overall conclusions and recommendations emanating from 
the seminars, textbook authors were urged to write books that encourage student creativity 
and critical thinking and present multiple vantage points including those of minorities. 
These recommendations, according to the paper reporting on the seminars (ibid), would be 
taken into account by the Ministry of Education in drafting new policies and revising 
existing curriculum guidelines. 
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1999-present: nation-building in retreat and the reappearance of educational reform 
 
Kuchma‟s second term of office announced yet another change in discourses affecting 
citizenship education. The change can best be characterized as a gradual decline in nation- 
building priorities and a re-emergence of educational reform, this time going hand in hand 
with a discourse of internationalization and competitiveness. As before, internal political 
developments lay at the root of this change. Having alienated the communists by his policy 
of (limited) economic reform, state consolidation and Ukrainian nation-building, Kuchma 
depended on the support of a motley crew of oligarchs, centrists, nationalists and reformers 
to win the 1999 elections (Kuzio 2005). After assuming his second term of office he 
rewarded his supporters by appointing the reformer Viktor Yushchenko, the former head of 
the national bank, as prime minister. Under the latter‟s leadership Vasil‟ Kremen‟, an 
academic who chaired the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, succeeded Zgurovski as 
education minister. Identifying globalization and individualization as global trends that 
necessitate educational reform, the new minister established three policy priorities for the 
Ukrainian education system: lifelong education, education fine-tuned to the needs and 
talents of individuals, and skills-oriented teaching in vocational education and the 
humanities to enhance the social capital of individuals (Kremen‟ 2006, pp. 1, 2). His key 
policy objective was to bring the education system in line with European and international 
standards in order to improve Ukraine‟s competitiveness. Once in office, he immediately 
launched an ambitious school reform which aimed at transforming the Soviet inherited 
system of ten years all-through comprehensive schooling into a twelve years system of 
elementary, lower secondary and upper secondary education (Kremen‟ 2004). In higher 
education all efforts were geared at participating in the Bologna process.
4
  
 
The shift in priorities was noticeable both on paper and in practice. While for instance the 
periodicals Osvita and Osvita Ukrainy had regularly reported on nation-building issues 
until the close of the decade, they increasingly published articles on the Bologna process 
and on other themes relating Ukrainian education to international trends from 2000 
onward. The decline in relative importance of nation-building was also reflected in the 
steady reduction of the number of hours devoted to the mandatory disciplines of History of 
Ukraine and Ukrainian Culture in higher education,
5
 a development that was much 
deplored by the advocates of Ukrainian revivalism. These intellectuals were equally 
disturbed by the Ukrainian-Russian agreement on the streamlining of the content of school 
history textbooks in the two countries. According to the National Association of Ukrainian 
Writers (NSPU) these policies reflected the “anticultural, immoral posture and snobbish 
attitude towards the titular nation [the ethnic Ukrainians], which is openly supported by the 
highest echelons of power, including the president and the patriarch of the Moscow-based 
Orthodox church” (NSPU 2002, p. 1). Further, in relation to language issues the 
government pursued a more pragmatic course by ratifying the Charter for Regional and 
Minority Languages, which commit states to the protection and endorsement of minority 
languages in a limited number of public domains, including education. 
 
                                                 
4
 The Bologna process seeks to establish a European Higher Education Area in which the participating 
institutions issue comparable degrees, recognize each other‟s diplomas and operate a system of accumulation 
and transfer of credits with the aim of increasing student and staff mobility.  
5
 All institutes of higher education have to teach these courses, regardless of their profile or status (public or 
private). The courses replaced a number of core disciplines from the Soviet era designed to impart 
Communist ideology. 
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Finally, the change could also be detected in the National Doctrine for the Development of 
Education (NDDE), a strategic document replacing the aforementioned State National 
Programme and outlining the government‟s long term vision for education. It stated that 
“Education is a strategic resource for improving people‟s well-being, assuring the national 
interests, and strengthening the authority and competitiveness of the Ukrainian state on the 
international scene” (NDDE 2002, p. 4). A close reading of this quotation reveals that it 
includes some elements referring to state consolidation („assuring the national interests‟; 
„strengthening the authority (…) of the state‟). The idea of state unity is further underlined 
by the stipulation on language education saying that the state will guarantee the mandatory 
command of the state language (i.e. Ukrainian) by all citizens. Elsewhere, the document 
repeatedly states that the aim of education is to enhance patriotism. Nonetheless, the stress 
on state consolidation did not preclude elements of citizenship education promoted by the 
Council of Europe from entering the text. On the contrary, references to democracy, civic 
attitudes and self-rule outnumber remarks pointing to unity and cohesion. Thus, the 
document calls on education to develop people with “a democratic state of mind, adhering 
to civic rights and freedoms” and capable of making “an independent judgement and a 
reasoned choice” and pursuing “civic activities” (ibid, p. 4). It further promised local 
authorities and parents a greater say in educational matters. 
 
The reformist government was short-lived, however. In April 2001 Yushchenko was 
removed from office by a parliamentary vote of no confidence (Kuzio, 2005). Thereafter 
Kuchma‟s regime steadily became more defensive and authoritarian. It acquired an 
increasingly bad reputation in the West for corruption, abuse of state power and muzzling 
the press. Feeling ever more isolated internationally, Kuchma allied with Putin‟s Russia to 
find support for his unpopular regime. 
 
Surprisingly, this change seems not to have affected educational policies much. Kremen‟ 
continued his school reform and internationalization agenda. The citizenship education 
elements from the National Doctrine were translated into state standards prepared for the 
new school system. The new standard for the theme „Knowledge of Society‟, for instance, 
mentions the cultivation of tolerance and respect for other nations, critical thinking, 
responsibility, independent judgement, and the ability to make a conscious choice as key 
assignments for school education (Government of Ukraine, 2004, p. 3). To meet the 
requirements of this standard, the Ministry of Education devised a series of new courses 
(philosophy, „man and world‟, law and economics) for upper secondary education under 
the heading „Civic Education‟ (Hromadians’ka osvita) (Ministry of Education, 2004, p. 
11). This meant that, for the first time since independence, citizenship education was given 
a formal place in the school curriculum.  
 
After the turbulent events of the Orange Revolution and the election of Yushchenko as 
president in December 2004, many members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia expected the 
new national democratic government to reinvigorate the Ukrainian renaissance project. So 
far, however, these expectations have not been met. Stanislav Nikolaenko, the new 
education minister, by and large continued the pragmatic, competitiveness-driven course of 
Kremen‟. Among the five policy priorities that he established for his term of office 
(European quality and accessibility of education, teacher salaries, democratization, 
overcoming the moral and spiritual crisis, and close cooperation between education, 
science and industry) nation-building concerns are conspicuously absent (Zhovta, 2005, p. 
2). Moreover, on the 17
th
 of May he made the dream of his predecessor come true by 
organizing Ukraine‟s formal accession to the Bologna process. According to one observer, 
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the Orange Revolution has even transformed Ukrainian national identity itself, bringing in 
notions of tolerance, inclusion, openness and democracy that will inspire future 
educational reform (Koshmanova 2006).  
 
Russia 
 
In this section of the article we will briefly introduce the changes in the education of 
citizens in the USSR and the Russian Federation. As in the Ukrainian part, the time to be 
discussed in the following could be roughly divided into three periods during which three 
discourses have competed for primacy in the education of citizens. During the Perestroika 
reforms and the first years after the establishment of the sovereign Russia, education was 
expected to revive the sub-national identification of various ethnic groups (1985-1992). 
The second period is concerned with Boris Yeltsin‟s time in the president‟s office (until 
1999). In educational terms, this period emphasised citizenship education for the 
establishment of a democratic state based on the rule of law. At the same time, since mid 
1990s we witness the return of the Russian national ideology. The third period covers the 
presidency of Vladimir Putin until summer 2005 and is characterised by a co-existence of 
the democratic and patriotic citizenship education discourses in which the latter dominates.  
 
1985-1992: regionalization and education in the ethnic spirit 
 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union was preceded by some fundamental changes in the 
political visions of the elites. Within the frame of the communist ideology, Mikhail 
Gorbachev‟s Perestroika and Glasnost aimed at making the Russian society more open, 
more plural and more critical to the authority of the state and the Communist Party. The 
developments in the wider society were echoed in the educational sphere, though not 
without considerable resistance on behalf of the conservative party leaders and some 
members of the teaching profession. But in 1989 Gorbachev himself referred to education 
as “his overall promotion of perestroika” (quoted in Webber, 1999, p. 25). Among the 
main aims of the educational restructuring was the democratization of the educational 
relations and management, which meant more say in the educational matters for regional 
authorities and parents. In addition, the nationalization of education was expected to 
transform schools into cultural institutions reviving and passing on the traditions and 
languages of various local cultures
6
. At the same time, the humanization of education 
emphasised the primacy of the individual in the educational process, whereas the de-
ideologization was expected to empty the school of the over-politicised (communist) 
contents. (Dneprov, 1998; Long & Long, 1999; Webber, 1999.)  
 
According to the reform goals, the educational system was expected to raise an individual, 
who is strongly attached to his/her ethnic group, but who paradoxically lacks a connection 
to the whole state and the nation. Isak Froumin (2004a, p. 280) has written that the 
emphasis on ethnic education was one of the most important features of the Russian 
education in the early 1990s. In addition, he identified a growing emphasis on the 
“universal human values” illustrated, for instance, by the Ministry‟s recommendation to 
                                                 
6
 In the Russian language the word “national” (natsional’nyi) bears two separate meanings. On the one hand, 
it is often applied to a particular ethnicity or nationality (natsional’nost’). When used in this way, the term 
does not imply all citizens of the country, but a particular ethnic group living on its territory. On the other 
hand, the word is also used exactly in the sense of the whole country. In this case, natsional’nyi is often 
applied to matters like national educational policy, national security etc. 
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introduce an interdisciplinary course titled “Mankind and Society” in the upper secondary 
school (ibid, p. 282). 
 
To use the metaphor cited by Eduard Dneprov, the Russian minister of education in 1990-
1992, the country was supposed to grow into a garden where all flowers bloom
7
. Whereas 
Dneprov‟s predecessor, Gennadi Yagodin, mainly believed that education in the local 
languages must be expanded, Dneprov insisted on each nationality and region to develop 
an educational platform in accordance with the local conditions. He stated that “the 
mission of the ministry must be, above all, not to unify, but rather to stimulate in all 
possible ways the expeditious development of such programmes”. (Long & Long, 1999, 
pp. 89-91.) Eduard Dneprov contrasted this initiative with the Soviet times, when the 
school played a crucial role in the de-nationalization of the people and constituted one of 
the main instruments in russifying the non-Russians and de-russifying the ethnic Russians 
(Dneprov, 1998, pp. 47-48).  
 
In line with the reform agenda, the document titled “The conception of the national school 
of the RSFSR and the scientific and organisational mechanisms of its implementation” 
adopted in 1990 argued that the system of compulsory education, which affects the entire 
population of the country, should be re-directed at the revival and satisfaction of people‟s 
national and cultural demands. The document emphasised that  
 
the school will turn into the real agency of cultural revival of the Russian nations only if it 
will be restructured as national in the true meaning of the word, if the national dimension in 
schooling and up-bringing will form its fundamental core (ibid, p. 26).  
 
The growing interest in the system of national schools is closely linked to the political 
context of those years. In 1988, after years of misapprehension or denial, Gorbachev 
finally identified the nationality policy as “the most fundamental vital issue of our society” 
(quoted in Lapidus, 1992, p. 46). Amidst increasing critique with regard to the Soviet 
nationality policies, ethnic conflicts and threats of disintegration, Gorbachev was forced to 
assert that  
 
we cannot permit even the smallest people to disappear, the language of even the smallest 
people to be lost; we cannot permit nihilism with regard to the culture, traditions and 
history of peoples, be they big or small (Gorbachev 1989 quoted in Lapidus, 1992, p. 60). 
 
Remarkably, in 1989 Uchitel’skaya Gazeta (the Teachers‟ newspaper), one of the leading 
professional publications for educators, introduced a column titled “Ethnos” to mark the 
importance of education in the ethnic spirit. In the time of political struggles and 
uncertainty, it was believed that inter-ethnic tensions and disintegration could be prevented 
with the help of national schools (Dneprov, 1998, p. 48). For the sovereign Russian 
Federation the nationalization and regionalization of education were also the instruments 
of building a federal state. The political leaders assumed that stronger national 
identifications of the regions will help them to achieve firm positions in the political and 
economic fields. On the societal level, the nationalization was expected to pave the way for 
the establishment of a democratic civil society (interview with Eduard Dneprov in Moscow 
27.5.2005; Srarovoitova 1989 quoted in Ossipov, 1999, p. 191). 
 
                                                 
7
 Nelli Piattoeva‟s interview with Eduard Dneprov in Moscow 27.5.2005.  
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At the same time, while stating that the school is the cradle of democracy and humanism, 
the implementation of democratization was more focused on educational management 
(shifting the decision-making process from the federal to the regional and municipal levels 
and from there to the schools) and on the teacher-student-parents relations (more influence 
on the educational process for all stakeholders). However, on the federal level less 
attention was paid to equipping children with the necessary knowledge and skills to build a 
democratic society and to encourage them to take an active role in it. Instead, as a reaction 
to the over-politicised nature of the Soviet vospitaniye (political and moral education) and 
the unpredictable situation in the society at large, the educational authorities wanted 
schools to preserve peace and stability and prevent any political movement or ideology 
from entering the school. (On the democratization of up-bringing work in comprehensive 
schools of the RSFSR, 1991.) 
 
1992-1999: the development of legal education 
 
The Yeltsin period (1992-1999) was marked by ambiguities. On the one hand, the reform 
agenda of Perestroika was carried over and formalised in various legislative acts arranging 
the introduction of human rights and legal education in the school curriculum. On the other 
hand and increasingly so from the mid-1990s, we see a return to a discourse stressing unity 
and loyalty to the state, running in an uneasy manner parallel to the democratic reform 
agenda in the remainder of the 1990s. 
 
The 1992 Law on Education, which was hailed as the first legislative act of the sovereign 
Russian Federation, clearly reflected the spirit of reform. The act declared the humanitarian 
character and the priority of universal human values as the first principles of the state 
policy in education (article 2). It also confirmed the right to receive comprehensive 
education in other than the Russian language (article 6, point 2). At the same time, the law 
stated that Russian should be studied in all state licensed schools, except pre-schools, 
according to the federal educational standards (article 6, point 5). The federal curricula 
published in 1993 declared that Russian, being the official language of the Russian 
Federation, should be taught in all schools, but in varying amounts depending on the 
linguistic situation in the region and the school. However, such statements do not 
necessarily imply that all federal authorities were aiming at the purposeful consolidation of 
the Russian nation. In fact, already in 1992 a group of civil servants from the Ministries of 
Education and Defence drafted a programme of patriotic education, which was rejected by 
the Ministry of Finances due to the lack of funds, only to be modified and adopted in 
2001
8
.  
 
During the second period in the development of Russian citizenship education the contents 
of history and the social sciences were revised. More so, the importance of a well-
organised citizenship education programme was explicitly stated. The ministerial letter 
“On citizenship education and the study of the Constitution of the Russian Federation” 
(1995) claimed that “the establishment of the legal state and the civil society in Russia will 
in many ways depend on the progress in citizenship education”. The emphasis on law 
studies is evident in the ministerial materials published between 1994 and 1999 (see also 
Morozova, 2000; Vaillant, 2001). The issued documents discussed the implementation of 
constitutional studies, studies in the electoral process and human rights. For example, the 
                                                 
8
 Nelli Piattoeva‟s interview with Igor Melnichenko 27.5.2005, specialist in patriotic education, deputy 
director of the Department of Youth Affairs at the Federal Agency of Education.  
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letter “On Citizenship and Legal Education of Students in Comprehensive Schools of the 
Russian Federation” (1996) highlight the need for legal knowledge. It referred to Boris 
Yeltsin‟s speech on 6 March 1996, in which he argued that one of the prerequisites in the 
transition to a legal state is the legal education of citizens.  
 
The first references to the Council of Europe‟s activities are found in a document which 
urged comprehensive schools to teach about human rights (On the study of human rights in 
the comprehensive schools of the Russian Federation in the school year 1998-9, 1998). The 
document claimed that since Russia‟s membership of the COE, the country has been 
adopting the organisation‟s instructions in the field of citizenship education, i.e. the 
Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers on teaching about human rights. The 
section on human rights was incorporated into the compulsory syllabi for social studies in 
the secondary school. During these years we also witness the emergence of innovative 
courses like “The basics of law studies”, “Citizenship education”, “To school children 
about the law” and others, many of which were developed in co-operation with foreign 
partners. However, these courses were not part of the federal (compulsory) curricula and 
their implementation depended and still depends on the regional authorities and the school 
(the regional and the school curricula)
9
. The first federal standards of higher education also 
contained courses related to citizenship education. The federal standard for primary teacher 
education (1995) introduced courses in political and law studies and, remarkably, 
exchanged the course of homeland history for the “The history of world civilisations”.  
 
Nevertheless, this period is also marked by a slow return to the unifying national ideology. 
In line with the ideas of the early 1990s, “The development strategy of historical and social 
science education in comprehensive schools” published in 1994 acknowledged the 
importance of teaching about ethnic, Russian and universal values, but assigned primacy to 
the national Russian ones. The following quote illustrates it well:  
 
When working on the content of school history education, it is necessary to guarantee the 
balance of political, cultural, ethno-national and other values but the national ones should 
prevail. 
 
The reading of the document leads one to think that the aim of education was converted 
into strengthening the national Russian identity and lessening the role of the local ethnic 
ones. And indeed, the above-quoted document expressed worries about the uneven 
illustration of national vs. ethnic aspects in the regionally published textbooks. It claimed 
that such an imbalance may lead to the “deformation” of interethnic relations. These 
changes closely followed the general political atmosphere in the centre. As has been well 
documented, in 1996 Boris Yeltsin appealed to the entire society to search for a new 
“Russian idea”. Most suggestions, published in Rossiyskaya Gazeta - the official periodical 
of the Russian government - supported state patriotism (Tolz, 2001, p. 256, our emphasis).  
 
The renewed drive to inculcate collectivist loyalties must be seen in the political context of 
the mid 1990s which was characterized by intense political rivalries in the centre and by 
movements for more autonomy in the peripheral regions. The elite in Moscow watched the 
                                                 
9
 The Law on Education introduced a decentralised form of curriculum consisting of the compulsory federal 
component taking 75 percent of the overall curriculum and a combination of the regional and school 
components filling the rest of the curriculum. The regional and the school components gave local 
stakeholders a chance to enrich the curriculum with subjects and contents meaningful for their local 
environment, e.g. local languages, history, geography etc. 
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nation-building attempts of the ethnic minorities in these regions with great concern, 
fearing that they “moved from cultural revival to well-organised political movements” 
(Tishkov, 1997, p. 241). This concern was not unjustified. Whereas the secessionist actions 
of the political elite of the republic of Tatarstan were still kept under control and were 
finally resolved in a peaceful agreement, the separatist tendencies in Chechnya have had 
much gloomier consequences (ibid, pp. 242-243). At the same time, the amount of votes 
received by Vladimir Zhirinovsky‟s party and the communists, whose primary election 
slogans referred to the restoration of the Soviet Union, patriotism and the inferior position 
of the ethnic Russians, forced liberal politicians to pay more attention to the questions of 
national identity (Tishkov, 1997; Tolz, 1998; Simonsen, 2001). 
 
1999-2005: the rise of patriotic education 
 
In the context of political struggles and fears of national disintegration, the new 
administration chose to focus on patriotic education of the Russian citizens. One indication 
of such a trend lies in the growing emphasis on vospitaniye (political and moral education), 
as one of the central responsibilities of the state educational system. In 1999 the Ministry 
of Education, for the first time since the break-up of the USSR, adopted “The Up-bringing 
Development Program for 1999–2001,” followed by another program for 2002–4. The key 
message of the programmes is the re-consolidation of the people: social, ethnic, cultural, 
generational and political. According to the programmes, citizenship and patriotic up-
bringing are among the main goals of state educational policies. In the institutions of 
higher education we witness the return of homeland history in the second generation of the 
educational standards adopted in 2000. The federal curricula for the comprehensive school 
published in 2004 contain more hours of Russian language and introduce Russian in the 
upper secondary school
10
. But at the same time, foreign language is now to be taught from 
the second grade of the primary school, which indicates a greater importance assigned to 
learning international communication competences.  
 
On the basis of the documents produced in 2001, especially the “The State Programme of 
Patriotic Up-bringing”, it could be suggested that Vladimir Putin and the current 
administration adhere to the idea of state patriotism, which first appeared under Yeltin‟s 
presidency. Without a doubt, there is a growing tendency to stress a uniform national 
identity in educational policies. This is demonstrated by the fact that in 2001 the Ministry 
of Education issued a letter titled “On the official rituals related to the use of the state 
symbols in comprehensive schools” and in 2002 the Ministry distributed another letter that 
aims at improving teaching about the national symbols (About the Organisation of Up-
bringing Activities Aimed at Familiarisation with the History and Implication of Official 
State Symbols of the Russian Federation and Their Popularisation). The Ministry of 
Education classifies this activity as an important element of patriotic and citizenship 
education, which is expected to guarantee generational continuity and to ensure societal 
unity. The students are expected to develop a strong bond and understanding of the state 
symbols, while the educational institutions should insure that the state heraldry is rightfully 
exhibited.  
 
More so, in 2003 the Ministry established a Coordinative Council on the patriotic up-
bringing of young people. The work of the Council is directly related to “The State 
                                                 
10
 Previously, the last two grades of the upper secondary school offered lessons in literature and non in the 
linguistic proficiency.  
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Programme of Patriotic Up-bringing” (2001). Patriotic up-bringing is defined as a 
systematic activity of state authorities and other organizations aiming at the development 
of patriotic consciousness, sense of loyalty to the Fatherland, willingness to fulfil one‟s 
civic duty, and constitutional responsibilities to defend the interests of the homeland. 
(Piattoeva, 2005, 45, our emphasis). The Programme and “The Concept of Patriotic Up-
bringing” (2003) both focus on the development of love and devotion to the Motherland 
Russia. It is stated that patriotism originates from love toward the “minor Motherland” and 
matures up to the point of state patriotic consciousness and love toward the Fatherland 
(The concept of patriotic education, 2003, p. 3). Thus Russian patriotism, as an expression 
of national identity, is superior to any other identification, including that with one‟s home 
region or ethnic group. Other researchers have also noticed that in contrast with the 1980s, 
contemporary history textbooks have become more like books about “the Russian people, 
Russian statehood and Russian culture”, thus eliminating sections on different ethnic 
groups living in Russia (Bogolubov, Klokova, Kovalyova & Poltorak, 1999, p. 540). Such 
discourses are common among politicians who criticise Russia‟s ethnic federalism and 
want to establish a more centralised state (Ossipov, 1999, p. 191). In order to diminish the 
influence of ethnically defined regions, the federal government has already instituted seven 
federal districts, which do not respect the established “ethnic” borders11 (Tolz, 2001, p. 
261). 
 
The promotion of state patriotism could imply that Russia is on its way to build a civic 
national ideology as opposed to the ethno-cultural conception of the nation promoted 
during the final years of Perestroika. Some minor steps in this direction were taken by 
Yeltsin‟s administration already earlier, when they adopted the civic term Rossiyanin 
(Russian citizen) as opposed to Russki (ethnic Russian) and declared the importance of 
building a legal state. However, the recent conception of state patriotism contains a few 
dangerous elements. It narrowly equates the state to the administrative apparatus in charge, 
it puts an explicit emphasis on servitude and it has a distinctive militaristic character.  
 
Nevertheless, we should not mistakenly think that the attempts to introduce a democratic 
citizenship education have completely faded away. The ministerial letter “On Citizenship 
Education of Comprehensive School Students of the Russian Federation” (2003) takes 
citizenship education away from the bare realm of legal studies. Citizenship education as a 
means of educating politically literate active participants of societal life should be achieved 
through a multifaceted combination of interdisciplinary approach, democratic school ethos 
and active teaching methods throughout all school grades. In this document we also 
observe the importance of patriotism, but in a more delicate phrasing. It argues that 
students‟ up-bringing should be based on socio-cultural and historical achievements of the 
multinational Russian nation, accomplishments of other countries, and cultural and 
historical traditions of the home area. In line with other educational documents (i.e. The 
National Doctrine of Education of the Russian Federation, 2000) it expresses concern 
about the harmonisation of national and ethno-cultural relations and the preservation of and 
support for languages and cultures of all nations of the Russian Federation. These 
documents combine two important components of democratic citizenship education, i.e. 
the development of a civic multinational Russian identity and education of politically 
active citizens. 
 
                                                 
11
 Russia is a federal state, which is divided into 88 constituencies. Continuing the legacy of the Soviet 
Union, many of these constituencies are formed on the basis of the ethnic principle, i.e. they are seen as a 
homeland of one or more ethnic groups.  
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Despite the apparent development in the understanding of democratic citizenship education 
– its progress from legal studies to a multifaceted interdisciplinary concept - patriotism has 
been given clear priority at the governmental level. Such a conclusion can be drawn when 
comparing the relative significance of the published documents. The state supported 
federal programme gives a clear sign of where the government‟s priorities lie. 
Furthermore, in the summer of 2005 the government approved a new programme of 
patriotic up-bringing for the years 2006-2010 with an extensive financial backing. At the 
same time, scholars and politicians advocating democratic citizenship education in line 
with the ideology of the Council of Europe have prepared a preliminary proposal for a 
federal programme of citizenship education for years the 2005-2010 which is still awaiting 
approval.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Our discussion of discourses framing citizenship education in Russia and Ukraine has 
revealed interesting parallels and differences between the two countries. During Glasnost 
and Perestroika both republics witnessed ever louder calls for the democratization and 
humanization of the education system. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
establishment of Ukraine and the Russian Federation as independent states, this discourse 
soon gave way to anxieties about state integrity. In both countries these anxieties were 
fuelled by ethno-culturally based separatist movements who had gained considerably in 
strength in the early 1990s when central power was at its weakest. From the mid-1990s 
concerns about state cohesion increasingly found their expression in re-centralizing 
policies and patriotic education programmes.  
 
By the same logic, circumstances in which the two countries differed have given rise to 
diverging policies. In Ukraine, anxiety and indignation about the vulnerable position of 
Ukrainian vis-à-vis Russian led to the adoption of an early cultural nation-building 
programme which sought to redefine Ukrainian language and culture in opposition to the 
Soviet past. Given the dominant position of the Russian language and culture, a similar 
cultural anxiety was not expressed in Russia in the late 1980s. Instead of initiating a 
Russian identity project, reformist education ministers promoted a policy aimed at the 
resuscitation of minority cultures within the Russian Federation. Only well into the 1990s 
was this policy overshadowed by the state cohesion discourse.  
 
The rather different trajectories in citizenship discourses that Ukraine and Russia have 
followed from the end of the 1990s also have their roots in diverging domestic political 
developments. In Russia president Putin reinforced the centralization and state cohesion 
agenda that his predecessor Yeltsin had pursued with a varying measure of success. 
Respect and understanding of state symbols and unconditional love and devotion to the 
Motherland are the key objectives this policy was designed to achieve. Some initiatives in 
democratic citizenship were incorporated into the curricula and the ministerial documents, 
but they were not given the same urgency as the patriotic education programme promoted 
at the federal level.  
 
In Ukraine, on the other hand, the education minister Kremen‟ was primarily motivated by 
a desire to bring the education system in line with international standards in order to 
improve the country‟s competitiveness. Nation-building was made secondary to a 
comprehensive school reform and participation in the Bologna process. As part of the 
effort to keep up with international trends, the government integrated EDC ideas advocated 
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by the Council of Europe in the National Doctrine of Education and in central curriculum 
guidelines. Nonetheless, some of the nation-building rhetoric was retained in these 
documents. 
 
It is tempting to interpret these recent differences between Ukraine and Russia as evidence 
of the two countries showing diverging trends. We would argue, however, that it is still too 
early to state this conclusion with certainty. The political situation in the post-Soviet world 
is still volatile, as witnessed by the recent revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, 
and policies may change abruptly when a new regime comes to power. Until now these 
turbulent developments have all been moving in the direction of democracy and the rule of 
law, but there is no guarantee that these trends are irreversible. Seen in this light, the recent 
relaxation of the nation-building project in Ukraine may well be only a temporary 
phenomenon.  
 
Interestingly, a report commissioned by the Council of Europe expresses doubts about the 
willingness of the post-Soviet states to support education for democratic citizenship 
(EDC), noting that most of them do not have explicit EDC policies. It further observes that 
EDC is challenged by “patriotic forces, which criticise democratic citizenship education 
for promoting simplistic universal values” (Froumin 2004b, p. 76). These forces, it argues, 
are more compatible with the traditional culture of an authoritarian society than the ideas 
promoted by EDC, and as a result EDC is relegated to the margins of citizenship 
education. The Council of Europe thus realizes that its EDC recommendations are not 
welcomed in all regional contexts, particularly when they conflict with nation-building 
projects.  
 
In sum an education agenda promoting active citizenship and independent thinking faces 
considerable obstacles in new states emerging from totalitarianism such as Ukraine and 
Russia. In these states the adoption or rejection of the democratic citizenship principles is 
very much dictated by the whims of domestic political events and will depend in large 
measure on the confidence of the authorities in the national loyalties of their citizenries. In 
times of instability and challenges to central state authority a discourse stressing pluralism, 
democracy and autonomy is easily exchanged for a programme sanctioning conformity, 
loyalty and patriotism in the broad area of citizenship education. 
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